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Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the 
role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal 
Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and 
assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities 
pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the 
time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level 
determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU 
countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence 
of either monetary or fiscal dominance. 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional view on price determination focuses on the role of monetary policy, 
usually neglecting the role of fiscal policy. Most analyses assume that the monetary 
authority is expected to set its control variable without facing any constraint, so that 
prices are determined by money supply and demand, in a conventional way. As a 
counterpart, the fiscal authority sets primary surpluses in order to assure fiscal solvency, 
for any path the price level could take. This scenario is refereed in the literature as the 
Ricardian or “monetary dominant” (MD) regime, and works as follows: monetary 
policy would be “active”, being price determination its nominal anchor; whereas fiscal 
policy would adjust according to a Ricardian rule in a “passive” way, so that the budget 
surplus path would be endogenous. 
 
  However, a new approach has emerged in the 1990s, which allows fiscal policy 
to set primary surpluses to follow an arbitrary process, not necessarily compatible with 
solvency. Therefore, the budget surplus path would be exogenous, and the endogenous 
adjustment of the price level would be required in order to achieve fiscal solvency. In 
this context, fiscal policy becomes “active”, with budget surpluses turning to be the 
nominal anchor; whereas monetary policy becomes “passive” and can only control the 
timing of inflation. This is the so-called non-Ricardian or “fiscal dominant” (FD) 
regime, and the literature developed on these assumptions is known as the Fiscal Theory 
of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL builds on the contributions of, among others, 
Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995, 2001), and Cochrane (1998, 2001, 
2005). This literature has been surveyed in Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Carlstrom 
and Fuerst (2000), or Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000); some critical appraisals can be 
found, e.g., in Buiter (1998, 2001, 2002), McCallum (2001, 2003), and McCallum and 
Nelson (2005). 
 
  But the role of fiscal policy in stabilization goes beyond the interactions between 
monetary and fiscal policies. Traditional macroeconomic analysis has mainly focused 
on the effectiveness of policy instruments depending on the exchange rate regime. More 
recently, the debate has turned to issues related to policy coordination, as well as the 
potential problems that could arise in monetary unions. Accordingly, some literature has 
emerged more recently on the implications of FTPL on inflation targeting in open 
economies and, in particular, for the case of monetary unions; see, e.g., Sims (1997),  2
Woodford (1997), Bergin (2000), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), and Ballabriga 
and Martínez-Mongay (2003). 
 
  This theory could be of particular interest for monetary unions since it might 
contribute to explain the different evolution of the price level across the member 
countries. Regarding the case of the European Union (EU), the fiscal limitations 
imposed to the member countries by the Maastricht Treaty, and later on by the Pact for 
Stability and Growth, should be interpreted as a way to assure a Ricardian regime. In 
this line, Woodford (1998, 2001) shows that a central bank committed to maintaining 
price stability cannot be indifferent as to how fiscal policy is determined.  
 
  In this paper, we will try to analyze to which extent the empirical evidence 
would support the assumptions of the FTPL, for the case of the EU countries 
participating in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). More specifically, we will 
try to investigate how fiscal sustainability is achieved: through the endogenous 
adjustment of the primary budget surplus (MD regime), or through the endogenous 
adjustment of the price level (FD regime).  
 
So far, the empirical evidence regarding the FTPL is not too abundant. The first 
contributions, both of them for the case of the US economy, were those of Bohn (1998) 
and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), who pioneered the two main approaches 
employed to test for the FTPL, namely, the so-called backward-looking and forward-
looking approaches, respectively. So, Bohn (1998) obtains, by means of econometric 
techniques, a positive response of the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio to the (lagged) debt-
to-GDP ratio. In turn, making use of VAR analysis, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) 
find that a positive innovation in the primary surplus would cause a fall in debt. 
Accordingly, the results of both studies would not support the existence of fiscal 
dominance. The methodology of Canzoneri et al. was also applied by other authors. 
Komulainen and Pirttilä (2002) examine the influence of fiscal deficits on inflation for 
several transition economies, concluding that a FD regime cannot be always identified. 
However, for the case of Brazil, Tanner and Ramos (2003) find that some periods of 
fiscal dominance could be documented.  
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  There are also some contributions that analyze the case of the EU. The first one 
was by Mélitz (2000), who shows that fiscal policy would have responded in a 
stabilizing manner to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio for the EU-15 countries. Later 
on, Ballabriga and Martínez-Mongay (2003) estimate monetary and fiscal rules for the 
euro area, and conclude that the MD regime would have prevailed in these countries 
throughout the years before the formation of EMU (1979-1998). In a further 
contribution, Ballabriga and Martínez-Mongay (2005) re-examine fiscal rules extending 
the period of analysis until 2002, and considering the possibility of structural change; 
their main finding was that the sustainability of public finances would have prevailed in 
most EMU countries even before the Pact for Stability and Growth. 
 
Afonso (2005) analyzes the relationship between the primary budget surplus and 
government debt, as percentages to GDP, using panel data for the EU countries over the 
period 1970-2003. His results give support to the Ricardian regime hypothesis 
throughout the sample period, as well as before and after both the Maastricht Treaty and 
the setting of the Pact for Stability and Growth. Finally, Creel and Le Bihan (2006) 
confirm for France, Germany, Italy and the UK, both using the primary surplus and its 
two separate components (cyclical and structural), the conclusions of Canzoneri, 
Cumby and Diba (2001), so that a MD regime would also apply to the experience of 
these countries. 
 
  In our empirical approach we will try to perform a systematic analysis of the 
relation between primary surplus and debt for the case of EMU countries, in the line of 
Bohn (1998). Additionally, this approach will provide us with an indirect test on the 
solvency of public finances in EMU countries. More specifically, we will start by 
estimating cointegration relationships between primary surplus and debt (both as ratios 
to GDP), on a country-to-country basis, for the EMU members over the period 1970-
2005. However, since this method might not be able to fully distinguish between a FD 
and a MD regime (see below), we will try to avoid this problem by performing Granger-
causality tests between primary surplus and debt. Finally, we will test for the eventual 
presence of structural breaks in the estimated relationships. 
  4
  The paper is organized as follows. The underlying theoretical framework is 
briefly described in section 2, the methodology and empirical results are presented in 
section 3, and the main conclusions are summarized in section 4. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background: The interactions between monetary and 
fiscal policies 
In general terms, the FTPL states that concerns about fiscal solvency can condition the 
policy of the central bank, even when the latter has been granted legal independence. An 
antecedent of this claim can be found in Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) contribution, 
where the interaction of fiscal and monetary variables in the financing of deficits, 
through taxes and seigniorage, was already analyzed. In this way, in some cases 
monetary policy should “accommodate” the path of expenditures and revenues chosen 
by the government, in order to guarantee fiscal solvency. The FTPL develops this idea, 
stating that policies considered a priori inconsistent can in fact co-exist in equilibrium, 
but at the cost of generating price instability. 
 
The arguments can be presented using the intertemporal, or present-value, 

































= ∑ j t t
j









b      (1) 
where b and s denote, respectively, the public debt and primary surplus, both as ratios to 
GDP; E is the expectations operator; and x and r stand, respectively, for the rate of 
growth of real GDP and the real interest rate, both assumed to be constant for 














































b      (3) 
i.e., solvency requires that the government must run expected future budget surpluses 
equal, in present-value terms, to the current value of its outstanding debt. 
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According to the conventional approach (identified as the Ricardian or MD 
regime), the price level would be determined in the money market, following the 
quantity theory of money, and the primary surplus would adjust endogenously to satisfy 
the present-value budget constraint. In terms of equation (3), s would be set to meet a 
given b, independently of the price level. The interdependence between monetary and 
fiscal policy can still appear in the following way (see Sargent and Wallace, 1981): 
assume that, in equation (3), seigniorage is allowed, so that b would denote all the 
government’s liabilities, and s include the seigniorage revenue. Hence, if b is given and 
the government wants to reduce the primary surplus, seigniorage must be increased 
keeping the total s constant, leading to a higher inflation. In this way, the requirements 
of fiscal solvency can mean a limit to the options open to the central bank. The corollary 
of this argument would be the now standard recommendation of granting independence 
to the central bank, which should assign a high priority to inflation, and strictly commit 
to understandable and publicized rules when conducting monetary policy. As a 
consequence, seigniorage eventually has disappeared as a source of budget deficit 
financing in advanced countries. 
 
  The theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy regimes 
characterized by Taylor-type rules (Taylor, 1993), shows the contribution of these rules 
to achieve both price and output stability. However, several studies [e.g., Ballabriga and 
Martínez-Mongay (2003), Larch and Salto (2005), or Jonung and Larch (2006)] 
conclude that monetary policy rules are not sufficient to guarantee price stability. 
Consequently, it has been argued that a rule for fiscal policy would be a useful tool, 
through commitments to satisfy the government’s solvency condition, and the 
introduction of budget targets or even of deficit rules. 
 
On the other hand, the FTPL assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price 
level even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. This theory 
would hold in the non-Ricardian regime or FD regime, where the primary surplus is set 
exogenously by the government, regardless of the level of public debt. In this 
framework, the price level would adjust in order to assure the fulfillment of the 
intertemporal budget constraint. And the main implication for fiscal policy would be 
that government solvency turns to be a sufficient condition for price stability.  
  6
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where B, P, and y denote, respectively, the nominal value of public debt, the price level, 
and real GDP. Then, given B, y, and s, P would “jump” to satisfy (3’). In other words, if 
the market believes the government’s commitment when setting s, a value of P will be 
set so that B was not excessive and (3’) could be satisfied. 
 
  The presence of interactions between monetary and fiscal policy opens the 
possibility of jointly allowing for rules for monetary as well as for fiscal policy. In 
terms of the game theory approach, the solution would be given by the leader-follower 
model. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) show the restrictions that government budget may 
place on monetary policy. Whether monetary or fiscal policy determines prices involves 




3. Empirical methodology and results 
The empirical literature has usually employed two approaches to test for the FTPL: 
(i)  The backward-looking approach (e.g., Bohn, 1998), which would imply that, 
in a Ricardian regime, an increase in the previous level of debt would result 
in a larger primary surplus today; i.e.,  t t s b ∆ → ∆ − 1 . 
(ii)  The  forward-looking approach (e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001), 
which would imply that, in a Ricardian regime, a larger primary surplus 
today would lead to a reduction in the future level of debt; i.e.,  1 + ∇ → ∆ t t b s . 
 
In this paper, we will follow the first approach, by estimating cointegration 
relationships between the primary surplus and the (lagged) level of debt, both as ratios 
to GDP: 
t t t v b s + β + α = − 1      (4) 
with being v an error term. Here, an estimated  0 > β  would indicate the prevalence of a 
MD regime, and an estimated  0 ≤ β  the prevalence of a FD regime. Notice that a  7
positive and significant estimated coefficient in that regression would be a sufficient 
condition for solvency, indicating that the government satisfies its present-value budget 
constraint. In other words, testing whether  0 > β  or  0 ≤ β  would provide an indirect test 
for fiscal solvency. 
 
  A problem with this approach, however, is that a positive estimate of β is strictly 
compatible with the presence of both a MD and a FD regime. That is, in a MD regime 
we would observe that an increase in debt in period t would lead to a larger primary 
surplus ex-post; i.e.:  1 + ∆ → ∆ t t s b , which implies an estimated  0 > β . However, in a FD 
regime, a decrease in the expected primary surplus would lead to a fall in the current 
debt ratio, through a price increase; i.e.:  t t t b s E ∇ → ∇ + 1 , which also implies an 
estimated  0 > β . For that reason, the cointegration analysis will be complemented with 
Granger-causality tests between primary surplus and debt. Finally, we will test for the 
eventual presence of structural breaks in the estimated relationships. 
 
We use data on primary (i.e., excluding interest payments) budget surplus, and 
general government consolidated gross debt, both of them as percentages of GDP, for 
the EMU member countries. The data cover the period 1970 through 2005 (except for 
France, the Netherlands, and Portugal, where they are available from 1977, 1975, and 
1973 on, respectively), and come from the official annual data base of the Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
 
As a first step of the analysis, we investigate the time series properties of the 
surplus and debt series using the tests of Ng and Perron (2001). The results are shown in 
Table 1, so that the null hypothesis of non stationarity cannot be rejected at the 5% level 
for the two series in all cases, independently of the test. Accordingly, both series would 
be concluded to be I(1). 
 
Since the result for the German primary surplus is unclear (strictly, the ADF
GLS 
test would reject the null of a unit root at the 5% significance level), we have also 
applied to this variable the test proposed by Perron and Vogelsang (1992a) of a unit root 
against the alternative of stationarity with structural changes. As can been seen in Table 
2, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level for the two  8
models considered, so the German primary surplus series would be also concluded to be 
I(1). 
 
Once analyzed the order of integration of the series, we are in position to 
estimate the parameter β  in equation (4). The estimation is made using the method of 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993), following the 
methodology proposed by Shin (1994). This method has the advantage of providing a 
robust correction to the possible presence of endogeneity in the explanatory variables, 
as well as of serial correlation in the error terms of the OLS estimation. Hence, we first 
estimate a long-run dynamic equation including leads and lags of the (first difference of 




j t j t t v b b s + ∆ ϕ + β + α = ∑
− =
− − − 1 1       (5) 
and then perform Shin’s (1994) test from the calculation of Cµ , a LM statistic from the 
DOLS residuals which tests for deterministic cointegration (i.e., when no trend is 
present in the regression). 
 
The results of the estimation of equation (5) for each country, in terms of the 
coefficient β  and the statistic Cµ , appear in Table 3. Two main results can be obtained 
from the table. First, since none of the cointegration statistics are significant at the 
conventional levels, the null of deterministic cointegration is not rejected in all cases. 
And, second, the estimates of β  are always positive and significantly different from zero 
at least at the 5% level (10% for Portugal); the only exception would be Finland, where 
the estimated coefficient is negative, but not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, a preliminary conclusion would emerge: except for Finland, where the 
opposite would happen, fiscal policy would have been sustainable in all the EMU 
countries, and a Ricardian or MD regime would have prevailed. 
 
However, as noticed before, in equilibrium the fiscal solvency condition holds in 
both regimes, and a positive estimate of β  can be found both in a Ricardian and in a 
non-Ricardian regime. A possible way of trying to distinguish between the two regimes 
would be performing Granger-causality tests. 
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According to Granger (1988), if Xt and Yt are cointegrated I(1) variables, they 
are generated by an error correction model. If we denote the error correction as Zt, then 
either ∆ Xt or ∆ Yt (or both) must be caused by Zt-1, which is itself a function of Xt-1 and 
Yt-1. Hence, if there is cointegration between a pair of variables, there must be causality 
between them in at least one direction, in order to provide these variables with enough 
dynamics to reach the equilibrium. So, if Zt is not used, the model will be misspecified 
and, in some cases, causality will not be detected. 
  
On the other hand, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that this problem only 
appears when both series are cointegrated. If the two I(1) series X t and Yt are 















1 1 1 1 1 1 0  (6) 
with an analogous representation holding for Yt as dependent variable. Then, to testing 
for Granger-causality, the null hypotheses would be: (i) γ 1 = 0, for the absence of long-
run causality; and (ii) α 2i = 0, for the absence of short-run causality. And the standard F 
test can be used to test for Granger-causality in the short and in the long run. 
  
The results of the Granger-causality test for the variables primary budget surplus 
and government gross debt are presented in Table 4. We report F statistics on the null 
hypotheses γ 1 = 0 and α 2i = 0, from the estimation of equation (6) with st and bt-1 
alternatively as dependent variables, and including up to three lags of the first difference 
of each of these variables. As can be seen, no long-run Granger-causality was found in 
any of the cases analyzed. In turn, bilateral short-run Granger-causality was found for 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria, and Portugal; whereas short-
run Granger-causality just from primary surplus to debt appears for the Netherlands and 
Finland, and no short-run Granger-causality was found in any sense for France.  
 
Therefore, the results from the Granger-causality tests do not allow us to 
ascertain whether fiscal solvency in EMU would have followed from a MD or a FD 
regime. Only in the case of the Netherlands some evidence on a FD regime might 
appear, whereas the previous results for Finland would be confirmed.  
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Next, we examine the possibility of instabilities in the cointegration relationship 
between primary surplus and debt. In this way, we extend the previous analysis in order 
to address whether the estimated relationship is stable over time, or it exhibits instead 
some structural break, allowing the instability to occur at an unknown date. To do so, 
we use the tests for parameter instability in cointegration relationships suggested by 
Hansen (1992). This author proposes some tests of parameter instability based on the 
“fully modified” estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990), through the SupF, MeanF, 
and Lc test statistics. All of them have the same null hypothesis (i.e., stability of the 
regression parameters), but differ in the alternative, since the SupF test captures changes 
in regimes, and the MeanF and Lc tests capture gradual shifts over time. 
 
In Table 5 we report the results from Hansen’s instability tests. As can be seen, 
the relationship between the primary budget surplus and government gross debt would 
seem to be clearly stable only for Germany and Greece, whereas some signs of 
instability would be detected in the rest of cases. The sequence of F statistics for 
structural change, along with 5% critical values for its largest value (SupF), its average 
value (MeanF), and for a fixed known breakpoint, are displayed in Figure 1. In 
particular, the sequence of the F statistic reaches the 5% critical value associated with 
the SupF test before 1983 and after 1996 for Belgium, before 1981 for Spain, between 
1988 and 1993 for France, after 1997 for Ireland, after 2000 for Italy, after 2001 for the 




In this paper, we have tried to analyze whether the empirical evidence would support 
the assumptions of the FTPL, for the case of the EMU countries over the period 1970-
2005. To that end, we estimated solvency equations for each country, by regressing the 
primary budget surplus on the (lagged) government gross debt, both as ratios to GDP. In 
particular, a positive and significant estimated coefficient in that regression would be a 
sufficient condition for solvency, indicating that the government satisfies its present-
value budget constraint. Our results showed that deterministic cointegration prevailed in 
all cases, and, with the only exception of Finland, the estimated regression coefficient 
was always positive and significantly different from zero. Therefore, in all the EMU  11
countries but Finland fiscal policy would have been sustainable over the whole period, 
with the primary surplus responding positively to the debt-GDP ratio, which would be 
indicative of the prevalence of a Ricardian or MD regime. On the contrary, in the case 
of Finland the primary surplus would not show a significant response to the debt-GDP 
ratio, pointing to the possibility of a non-Ricardian or FD regime. 
 
However, in equilibrium, the fiscal solvency condition holds under both the MD 
and FD regimes; and the difference between them would come from how fiscal 
sustainability is achieved, i.e., through the endogenous adjustment of the primary 
budget surplus in the MD case, or through the endogenous adjustment of the price level 
in the FD case. For that reason, in order to distinguish between the two regimes, we next 
performed Granger-causality tests between primary surplus and debt, but the results 
from the tests did not allow us to achieve any firm conclusion about the prevalence of 
either a MD or a FD regime. Finally, we also tested for the eventual presence of 
structural breaks in the estimated long-run relationships, finding some evidence of 
instability in most cases, with the main exceptions of Germany and Greece. 
 
To conclude, although we have found no clear evidence supporting the FTPL in 
the EMU case, it should be recalled the prominent role to be played by fiscal policy in 
EMU as the main instrument available to individual countries when dealing with 
asymmetric shocks. In fact, the main assertions of the FTPL would seem rather extreme 
and have been somewhat softened later on by some of their main proponents (see, e.g., 
Woodford, 2003). In any case, fiscal policy appears to have important effects on 
achieving macroeconomic stability, which has recently called for the introduction of 
rules on fiscal policy, such as the Pact for Stability and Growth in the case of EMU. 
 
Notice indeed that the new scenario given by EMU and the Pact for Stability and 
Growth should strengthen the response of the primary surplus to debt, in order to keep 
the budget not far from equilibrium, and guarantee the long-run solvency of fiscal 
policy (European Central Bank, 2004). Our findings, however, would point to an ease in 
last years, of the fiscal stance in some countries that exhibit fiscal solvency over the 
whole period; this would be the case of Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. Finally, it is still possible that fiscal authorities could behave in a non 
linear fashion, so that fiscal solvency might hold in some periods, but not in others. In  12
particular, an extension of the analysis in this paper could make use of the methodology 
applied in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2006), where significant nonlinear 
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Ng-Perron tests for unit roots 
 
A) Government gross debt 
 
  GLS Z M α  
GLS
t Z M  
GLS ADF
Belgium    0.29    0.20    0.16 
Germany  − 6.82  − 1.83  − 2.08 
Greece  − 2.32  − 0.94  − 1.13 
Spain  − 0.62  − 0.27  − 0.29 
France  − 4.20  − 1.44  − 1.74 
Ireland  − 0.21  − 0.16  − 0.39 
Italy  − 0.26  − 0.12  − 0.19 
Netherlands  − 0.38  − 0.28  − 0.54 
Austria  − 0.77  − 0.33  − 0.35 
Portugal  − 2.29  − 1.03  − 1.41 
Finland  − 3.25  − 1.24  − 1.42 
 
 
B) Primary budget surplus 
 
  GLS Z M α  
GLS
t Z M  
GLS ADF
Belgium   − 5.00  − 1.52  − 1.91 
Germany  − 12.92  − 2.52  − 3.41 
Greece   − 5.57  − 1.66  − 1.95 
Spain   − 4.60  − 1.48  − 1.78 
France   − 9.55  − 2.18  − 2.69 
Ireland   − 5.12  − 1.50  − 1.72 
Italy   − 5.65  − 1.61  − 2.04 
Netherlands   − 8.72  − 2.04  − 2.40 
Austria   − 9.20  − 2.14  − 2.65 
Portugal   − 6.41  − 1.77  − 2.15 




(i)   Only the 
GLS ADF  statistic for the German primary budget surplus is significant at the 5% 
level. The critical values are taken from Ng and Perron (2001), Table 1. 
(ii)    The autoregressive truncation lag has been selected using the modified Akaike information 
criterion, as proposed by Perron and Ng (1996).  
  
Table 2 
Perron-Vogelsang tests for unit roots with structural changes, for the 
German primary budget surplus 
 
Model  Tb  k  δˆ   θˆ   αˆ   αˆ t  
IOM 1982  3  − 1.01  2.19 0.54  − 4.60 
    (− 0.80) (3.65)    
AOM 1978  3  −   0.86  − 0.12  − 4.07 




(i) None of the  αˆ t  statistics are significant at the conventional levels. The critical values are taken from 
Perron and Vogelsang (1992b), Table 1 (AOM model) and Table 2 (IOM model), for T = 50. 
(ii) t-statistics in parentheses. 








1 ) ( 
where DUt = 1 if t > Tb and 0 otherwise, D(Tb)t = 1 if t = Tb + 1 and 0 otherwise; and, second, the additive 
outlier model (AOM): 
t t t y DU y ~ + θ + µ =  




















Estimation of long-run relationships: Stock-Watson-Shin cointegration 
tests 
 
  β  
2 R   Cµ  
Belgium 0.07  0.98  0.126 
 (0.003)     
Germany 0.14  0.88  0.109 
 (0.006)     
Greece 0.06  0.92  0.112 
 (0.03)     
Spain 0.06  0.92  0.159 
 (0.003)     
France 0.07  0.99  0.216 
 (0.005)     
Ireland 0.10  0.95  0.180 
 (0.007)     
Italy 0.15  0.98  0.155 
 (0.004)     
Netherlands 0.08  0.84 0.232 
 (0.03)     
Austria 0.02  0.91  0.129 
 (0.005)     
Portugal 0.11  0.86  0.173 
 (0.06)     
Finland  − 0.09  0.96 0.115 




(i)  None of the Cµ  statistics are significant at the conventional levels. The critical values are taken 
from Shin (1994), Table 1, for m = 1. 
(ii)  Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for long-run variance. The long-run variance of the 
cointegrating regression residuals was estimated using the Bartlett window with l = 5 ≈  INT(T
1/2), 
as proposed in Newey and West (1987). 
(iii)  The number of leads and lags selected was q = 3 ≈  INT(T




Sims-Stock-Watson tests for Granger-causality 
 
  H0  st →  bt− 1  bt− 1 →  st 
Belgium  γ 1 = 0  0.864    0.054 
  α 2i = 0    3.629
**     12.09
*** 
Germany  γ 1 = 0  0.569    0.001 
  α 2i = 0    3.684
**      8.96
*** 
Greece  γ 1 = 0  0.023   0.001 
  α 2i = 0    6.200
**     5.818
** 
Spain  γ 1 = 0  1.418   0.165 
  α 2i = 0    5.673
**     4.734
** 
France  γ 1 = 0  0.005   0.001 
  α 2i = 0  1.406   0.002 
Ireland  γ 1 = 0  0.001   0.375 
  α 2i = 0    5.683
**    2.581
* 
Italy  γ 1 = 0  1.387   0.241 
  α 2i = 0   3.894
*    2.660
* 
Netherlands  γ 1 = 0  1.738   0.010 
  α 2i = 0    7.599
**   0.085 
Austria  γ 1 = 0  0.312   0.051 
  α 2i = 0    6.127
**      6.875
***
Portugal  γ 1 = 0  1.048   0.053 
  α 2i = 0    7.848
**     3.837
** 
Finland  γ 1 = 0  0.428   0.038 
  α 2i = 0    3.689




(i)  The reported values are F-statistics on the null hypotheses γ 1 = 0 and α 2i = 0, from the estimation 













Hansen tests for parameter instability 
 
  Lc  MeanF  SupF 
Belgium 0.48  36.0  187.3 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Germany 0.15  1.83  4.77 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Greece 0.19  1.80  11.10 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.10) 
Spain 0.33  23.58  147.4 
 (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
France 0.81  9.74  28.72 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Ireland 0.35  6.86  66.09 
 (0.10)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Italy 0.35  5.05  18.07 
 (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Netherlands 0.17  3.22  14.49 
 (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.02) 
Austria 0.19  8.73  39.00 
 (0.20)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Portugal 0.52  5.30  11.89 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Finland 0.397  43.02  144.9 




(i)  Probability of parameter instability in parentheses. 
(ii)  According to Hansen (1992), a relation is said to be stable if the estimated probability is greater 
or equal than 20%. 